Thepracticeoflettinglandsbyproportionalrents……isverygeneralonthecontinent;andwhereverithasbeenadopted,ithasputastoptoallimprovements,andhasreducedthecultivatorstothemostabjectpoverty[PrinciplesofPoliticalEconomy（Edinburgh,1843）,p.471].[27].Mill,PrinciplesofPoliticalEconomy,p.380.[28].Ibid.,pp.366-67.[29].Ibid.,p.367.[30].Ibid.,pp.365-66.[31].NotethatthelaststatementinthisquotationisquitedifferentfromJones'sview.[32].SeeMill,PrinciplesofPoliticalEconomy,p.363andthesecondfootnoteonp.364.[33].Ibid.,p.363.[34].Ibid.,p.364.[35].MillquotesSismondiinibid.,pp.363-64.[36].,forexample,Jones,DistributionofWealth;Sismondi,PoliticalEconomy,chap.3；McCulloch,PrinciplesofPoliticalEconomy,pt.3；andMill,PrinciplesofPoliticalEconomy,bk.2.[37].Mill,PrinciplesofPoliticalEconomy,,classicalwritersfailedtotreatlandrentaspartofproductioncost.[1]Furthermore,,beforeMarshall,SismondiandMillhadnotplacedmuchweightonthetax-equivalentargument,Marshallrenewedthethesis,presumablybecausetheanalogytoataxundersharerentfitsratherneatlyintohismarginalanalysis.[2]Evenwithsuchanapproach,'sPrinciples,,,letusassumethattheonlytenantinputislabor.Infigure4,tenantlabor,t,ismeasuredalongthehorizontalaxis,,

,ishorizontalinapetitivemarket,,equilibriumisatB,,wehavethemarginalequality:

=.Thesameresultobtainsforownercultivation,whethertheownerworksuptot2andworkselsewhere,,,however,themarginaltenantreceiptnetofrent,

（1-r）,,ifthelandownertakes[3]percentoftheannualyield（r=0.4）andthetenanttakes60percent,

（1-r）'sdecisionmadeatthemargin,itissaid,equilibriumisatA,wherethemarginaltenantcostequalsthemarginaltenantreceipt;thatis,

=

（1-r）.,thetotalproductisrepresentedbytheareaODJt1,withthelandownergettingarentequaltoareaEDJAandthetenant',areaMEArepresentstheamountreceivedbytheten-antoverandabovehisalternativeearning（areaOMAt1）.WithequilibriumatA,（withareaJABrepresentingtheeconomicwaste）.ItwaswiththisanalysisinmindthatMarshallmented: