Thereareexceptions,,,inhis"ResourceAllocationunderShareContracts,"JournalofPoliticalEconomy（April,1950）,,ChineseFarmEconomy（Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1930）；,"FarmTenancyandProductivityinAgriculture:TheCaseoftheUnitedStates,"FoodResearchInstituteStudies（1963）.Weshalldiscussthisinchapter3.[2].InthePhilippines,forexample,,"PhilippineLandReform,1950-1958,"InternationalCooperationAdministration,USOMIPhilippines（Manila,1958）."landreform",forexample,themuchpublicizedfarmlandreformdidnotspringupatonetime:itwastheproductofaseriesofelaborateadjustmentsandenforcementsofthelawsalreadyinexistence.AftertheJapaneseretrocessionofTaiwantoChinain1945,,thecrucialarticlesofwhichwillbediscussedinthenextsection,,atotalofover350articleswereappendedtodefinetheTaiwanlandreform.[1]Despiteitsplexity,,,,promulgatedandenforcedinTaiwanfromApril14,1949.[2]Thesecondsetincludesthirty-onearticles,promulgatedonJune7,1951,andintendedtogointoeffectinFebruary1952.[3]Whiletheprovisionsofbothwillbeexaminedinlaterchapters,itistheeconomicimplicationsofthefirstsetuponwhichIshallconcentrate,-farmers.[4]Thisprogram,promulgatedinJune1951andcarriedoutfromJuly1951toJune1953,.[5]"Land-to-the-TillerAct,",-halftimesthegrossannualyieldofthelandbeingpurchased,,,transfersoflandrightsamongindividualswereprohibited.[6],"protect":

……Withthelimitedfarmlandandtheirrationaltenuresystem,ruralunderemploymentpresentedaseriousproblem.[7]

Asecondjustificationofferedisthatfarmingundertenancy,andsharetenancyinparticular,iseconomicallyinefficientonthreecounts.[8]（1）.（2）Thetenant'sincentivetofarmwasdiscouragedbyasharecontract,sincepartofeveryunitofoutputproducedwouldgotothelandownerasrent.（3）And,sincetherentalscollectedbylandownerswereexorbitantlyhigh,,asharecontract,theyclaimed,,theevidencetheycitetosupportthe"exploitation"argumentisperhapscontradictorytotheirclaimofinefficienttenancy:forexample,landownersfrequentlystipulatedthattheirtenantsprovideseedsandfertilizers,andrequiredthattheyworkhard.[9]