[24].Ibid.,,"PeasantsandDualismwithorwithoutSurplusLabor,"JournalofPoliticalEconomy（October,1966）,pp.445-46.[25].Johnson,"ResourceAllocation,"p.111.[26].Ibid.,v.,pp.118-21.[27].Ibid.,:

Ihaveestimatednetrentsoncrop-share-rentedfarmsinIowafrom1925through1946.From1925through1934netrentsonshare-rentedfarmsaveragedperhapsadollarperacrelessthanoncash-rentedfarms.From1935through1939thenetrentswereroughlythesame.From1940through1946netrentswereatleastfourdollarsanacremoreonshare-rentedthanoncash-rentedfarms.[28].Ibid.,pp.119-20.[29].Ibid.,p.120

[30].Ibid.,p.121.[31].Ibid.,p.118.[32].Ibid.,p.120.[33].Ibid.,-equivalentanalysis,asimplegeometricpresentationwillsuffice.Thisisillustratedinfigure5,,

,andthemarginaltenantreceiptundersharerent,

（1-r）.Accordingtothetax-equivalentapproach,equilibriumisatA,withtheamountoftenantinputequaltot1.Infigure5,=0.4whichdefines

（1-r）,ift2oftenantlaboriscontractuallystipulated,thelandowner'sshareofthetotalproductintheformofrentequalsareaEDBC,andthetenant',thetenant'sshareisstillhigherthanhisalternativeearning（areaOMBt2）,withareaMEAgreaterthanareaABC,whichmeansthatthetotalrent（areaEDBC）willbesmallerthanthatofawageorafixed-rentcontract（areaMDB）.Giventhemarginaltenantreceipt,