第25章 《佃农理论》英语原著 (19)
FromtheaboveSchickele(andHeadyafterhim)"efficient"inputsubsidizationbythelandownerwassought.Usinga50percentrentalshare(r=0.5),andusingthehorizontalaxisoffigure4tomeasurenonlandinputsingeneral,Schickeleconcludedthat"ifthelandlordwouldshareequallyinalltheinputcostsgoingintocropproductiontheintensitywouldbecarriedto[t2],thatis,tothesamedegreewhichcorrespondstomaximumefficiency."[19]Itseconomiccontentaside,whatcouldhavebeenmerelyageometric"accident"
(1-r)intomarginal(output)costcurves,butwiththecurvesarbitrarilydrawn.[20]Thus,onSchic-kele':"Thecostofvariablefactors(whereonefactorsuchaslandisfixed)mustbedividedbetweenthelandlordandthetenantintheproportionsthatholdforthedivisionoftheproduct[toattainefficiency]."[21]Letmeclarify.Returntofigure4,whereweuser=,r,is0.5(thatusedbySchickele).,ifthelandownercontributesnonlandinputsfromt1tot2,hewouldthenbesharingexactlyhalfthenonlandinputcost-orsharingit"intheproportionsthatholdforthedivisionoftheproduct.",recall,is1—rofateverypoint,,butaparadoxicalresultoneobtainswithoutit:Givenanyrentalpercentage,andawageratejusthighenoughtoreducetenantinputtozero(accordingtothetax-equivalentanalysis),thevalueoflandisstillpositive(sincethetotalproductisstillgreaterthanthetotalwage).Woulditbesensibletosay,then,thatincertaincasesthevalueoflandtothetenantisposi-tivebutheisnotwillingtoofferanysharepaymentforitsuse?

