)/rportionofrentwereassignedexclusivelytoanindividualtenant(ortenants),say,throughtheissuanceofstocksagainstthemarketvalueofthegivenland,,,'ssharebeingreduced,,underthesharerestrictioninTaiwan,,itwillberecalled,,themarginalproductoftenantlaborwillneverbenegative.(Thisisimpliedbythemaximizingbehaviorofthelandownerundertheaddedshareconstraint.)Supposeboththerentalpercentageandthenonpecuniarybene-

fitsofowninglandareeffectivelyreducedtozero;thatis,privatelandownershipisreducedtoameretitle,devoidofanyformofine.Returnmomentarilytofigure7;petitionamongtenantswillpushlaborinputtopointk,wherethewagerateequalstheaverageproductoflabor,,themarginalproductoflaborinthiscasemaybenegative.[2]Thatistosay,iftheentireinefromlandisunassignedtoanyindividualorprivateparty,landbeesamonpropertyresource(inourcase,withaprivatetitle),andpetitionamongusersimpliesthatnonlandresourceswillbeallocatedtolanduntiltheinetoland(rent)iszero.[3]

Fromtheabovediscussionwemaygeneralize:Foranyproductionfunctionrequiringresourceinputshandt,iftherighttoaportionoftheinefromh,howeversmall,isnotappropriatedorexclusivelyassigned,theratiot/hwillriseunderpetition,implyingafallinthemarginalproductoftandariseinthemarginalproductofh;astheunassignedinefromhincreases,themarginalproductoftwillaccordinglybelower,"theproductiontheoremofpropertyrightassignment."

[1].Thisshouldbedistinguishedfromaninetax,,themisallocationgeneratedbyataxonresourceusestemsnotfromthetaxitself,butfromthefactthatnogovernmentofficialistherebygrantedauthoritytomakedecisionsonresourceuse.[2].Inthisandmyearlierstatementthatthemarginalproductoftenantlaborwillneverbenegativeifisgreaterthanzero,theargumentwouldperhapsbemoreconvincingifthemarginalproductoflaborintherelevantrangewerealwayspositive,sothatwhen

=0itisstillpositive(withthewagerateequalingtheaverageproductoflabor).=0,butalsothesuppositionthatthetitleholdercannotdenytenantfarmingonapetitivebasis.[3].Withasomewhatdifferentapproach,,"TheEconomicTheoryofaCommon-PropertyResource:TheFishery,"JournalofPoliticalEconomy(August,1954).AnditisimplicitinProfessorPigou'simaginativeexampleoftworoads,,TheEconomicsofWelfare(London:Macmillan,＆Co.,1920),p.194;,"SomeFallaciesintheInterpretationofSocialCost,"QuarterlyJournalofEconomics,vol.38(1924).Thecorrectanalysisexplainingthedissipationofrent,tomymind,isanalogoustoCournot'sduopolysolutionwithfreeentry:withrentalinereplacingmonopolyrent,theaggregateaverageproductoflaborreplacingmarketdemandforproduct,,thetenantswouldrecieveearningsfromfarminginexcessoftheiralternativeopportunities;butpetitionamongtenantsofferingtoincreasenonlandfarminginputseliminatestheresidualearnings(unlessthemarginalproductofnonlandinputsgoestozero).Undereffectivesharerestriction,,andwithalowerrentalpercentagethelandowner'srentalinewillbepartiallyrestoredbyahigheroutput.