Iamalsoindebtedtothreesourcesforfinancialaid:totheLillyEndowmentIncorporatedgrantsupportingthestudyofpropertyrightsandbehavioratUCLA,totheUniversityofChicago,fortheirPost-DoctoralFellowshipinPoliticalEconomyfortheacademicyear1967-68，-SheongCheungChicago,,thelandownerprovideslandandthetenantprovideslabor;,definedhereastwoormoreindividualpartiesbiningprivatelyownedresourcesfortheproductionofcertainmutuallyagreedoutputs,,tobederivedfromstandardeconomicprinciples,.[1]Itwillbeshownhere,boththeoreticallyandempirically,,hiresfarmhandstodothetilling,leaseshisholdingsonafixedrentbasis,,;,however,ifpropertyrightsareattenuatedordeniedasprivate,,inAppendixA,,,relatingtoresourcereallocation,,,evidencewillbepresentedtoconfirmthatundereffectiverentalsharereductionthemarginalproductoflandintenantfarmswillbehigher,andthemarginalproductsoftenantinputswillbelower,,,duringthefirstphaseoftheTaiwanlandreformprogram,therentalsharereductionwascarriedoutbeforeotherreformmeasureswereintroduced.[2]Thus,,inTaiwanboththeprovisionsoftherentalsharereductionandtheirenforcementarerestrictiveenoughtorevealsomeofthemajorimplicationsderivedfromthetheoryofsharetenancy.[1].Classicaleconomistsaside,contemporarythesesonsharetenancywhichimplyinefficientresourceallocationinclude:RainerSchickele,"EffectofTenureSystemsonAgriculturalEfficiency,"JournalofFarmEconomics（February,1941）；EarlHeady,"EconomicsofFarmLeasingSystems,"JournalofFarmEconomics（August,1947）；EarlHeadyandEarlKehrberg,"RelationshipofCrop-ShareandCashLeasingSystemstoFarmingEfficiency,"ResearchBulletin（IowaStateCollegeAgriculturalExperimentStation,May,1952）；CharlesIssawi,"FarmOutputunderFixedRentsandShareTenancy,"LandEconomics（February,1957）；-Roegen,"EconomicTheoryandAgrarianEconomics,"OxfordEconomicPapers（February,1960）；,"PeasantsandDualismwithorwithoutSurplusLabor,"JournalofPoliticalEconomy（October,1960）.