Anycontractbiningresourcesfromdifferentownersforproductioninvolves,inadditiontonegotiationcosts,theenforcementcostsofcontrollinginputsanddistributingoutput,（thesumofnegotiationandenforcementcosts）,amongotherthings,includetherentalpercentage,theratioofnonlandinputtoland,andthetypesofcropstobegrown.[11]-rentandwagecontracts,however,giventhemarketprices,onepartyalonecandecidehowmuchoftheotherparty',,the"shirking"oflaborinput,whichmayexistinawagecontract（alsoinasharecontract）withouteitherenforcingtheinputorcheckingtheoutput,iscostlytoprevent.[12]Butwhilethis"shirking"problemdoesnotappearsignificantforlandinputinafixed-rentcontract,policing（orenforcing）themaintenanceofsoilandotherassetsownedbythelandlordismorecostlyforafixed-rentorasharecontractthanforawagecontract.[13]Ifweaccepttheabovereasoning,pendingempiricalconfirmation,andiftransactioncostistheonlyconsideration,,then,aresharecontractschosen?

,definedheretomeanthatanindividual,giventhesameexpectedaverageine,,variablesexogenoustotheproductionfunction,suchasweatherconditionsandpests,-rentcontract,thetenantbearsmost,ifnotall,oftherisk;underawagecontract,thelandownerbearsmost,ifnotall,（orriskdispersion）；thatis,,asharecontractwillbemutuallypreferredbythelandownerandthetenant.[14]Risk,however,,then,arefixed-rentandwagecontractschosenatall?

,,giventhetransactioncost,riskaversionimpliesthatassetvaluesandthevariancesofinearenegativelyrelated.[15]Whileinitselfthedispersionofriskunderasharecontractwillleadtohighervaluesforthecon-tractedresources,（orutilitymaximization,dependingontherelevantmeasurementproblem）,-persionmaynotconformtothemostpreferablestateaccordingtotheparties',however,,ofcourse,,:

,,ifathirdparty（aninsurancepany）weretoinsuretheexpectedmeanyield,',perhaps,isthatthecostofhandlinginsurancetransactionsmaybesohighastobeprohibitive:（sharecropping）,however,ConstantiaMaxwellobserved:

TheusualprocedureforFrenchseigneurswas,whileretainingthechateauanditsimmediateneighborhoodfortheirownuse,toletouttheirlandsingrostomiddlemenorfermiers（tobedistinguishedfromfermiersexploitants）,,likethelandlords,wereabsenteesandworkedtheestatethroughsub-agents.[16]