Iftheaggregatesupplyoftenantlabortofarmingisupwardsloped,theincreasedfarmingintensitywillbidupthewagerate,,,thetenants''inesfromlandareconfinedstrictlytooftheannualyield,,thetotalagriculturaloutputwillrise.[2]Butthediscrepanciesinthemarginalproductsofresourcesinthevarioussectorsimplyeconomicallyinefficientuseoftheexistingresourcesofthesociety.[1].Notethataslongasthelawofdiminishingreturnstotenantlaborholds,rentalineforthelandownerundertheshareconstraintwillneverbeashighasitwasinitially.[2].Thisimpliesthatthepricesoffarmproductswillfallrelativetothoseofothergoods,,?AConfusionbetweenthe1949and1951ProvisionsBeforeweproceedtotesttheimplicationofincreasedfarmingintensityinthenexttwochapters,itisessentialtopointoutthat,underthesharerestrictioninTaiwanfrom1949to1951,,however,therentalrestrictioninTaiwanwasafixedandnotapercentagerestriction,whichwouldmeanthatthelandowner'sincentiveforincreasingtenantinputsoverlandwaseliminated.[1],letusturntoSidneyKlein:

Theincentivesamongtenantstoinvesttheirhard-earnedpreciousinesweregreat.…Undertherentreductionstatutes,theirrentwasfixedat37.5percentofthestandardorexpectedyieldandnottheactualyieldharvested,sothatwhentheysoldtheharvestabovethestandardyieldtheycouldkeepalltheproceedsforthemselves.[2]